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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GLEN L. HALL and VERONA W.
HALL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No.

vs.

13646

GRACE M. BINGHAM,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to establish boundary line between
adjacent properties based on long established fenceline
ratified by written agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant-Respondent filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment based on records filed in the proceedings and
the transcript of proceedings had in the court on the 24th
day of October, 1973, and exhibits entered therein. The
case was heard by the Honorable Calvin Gould, who
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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issued a bench ruling on February 20, 1974, in favor of
respondent holding in effect that a Warranty Deed executed by Plaintiffs-Appellants in 1962 precluded Appellants from claiming old fenceline as boundary line, even
though said line was subsequently ratified and re-established by written agreement executed contemporaneously
with the execution of the Warranty Deed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants-Plaintiffs ask that the judgment of the
lower court be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants and Respondent are adjacent land owners.
Appellants purchased their property some time in the
year 1937 (R. 63, Line 10). Respondent purchased the
property adjacent and north of Appellants' land in April
of 1972 (R. 77, Lines 11 and 12). Appellants built a home
on the property in which they have resided for the past
13 years (R. 63, Lines 12 and 13). The property had
been separated by an old fence in existence prior to 1950
(R. 60, Lines 11 and 12; R. 82, Lines 2 through 5; R. 83,
Lines 11 through 12; R. 84, Lines 1 through 2). Appellants had planted an orchard, shrubs and lawn on their
side of the fence, all visible to Respondent prior to the
time of her purchase (R. 84, Lines 18 through 25;
R. 85. Lines 1 through 20). The Appellants in 1962
executed a deed conveying title to Simmons and
Wiberg the property claimed by the Respondent.
At or about the same time of signing said Deed,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Simmons and Wiberg executed an agreement by and
through their (Secretary-Treasurer, Ruth E. Simmons,
(R. 257) acknowledging, acquiescing in, and accepting
the existing fenceline as the dividing line between the
properties.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A DRASTIC
REMEDY AND SHOULD BE GRANTED
O N L Y W H E N U N D E R T H E FACTS
VIEWED MOST FAVORABLE TO THIS
APPELLANT HE SHOULD NOT RECOVER
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., (1958) 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P. 2d 264, the Utah
Supreme Court said at page 265,
"The Motion for Summary Judgment is, in
effect, a demurrer to the contentions of the adverse party, saying: 'Conceding the facts to be
as you claim, there is no basis for a recovery'.".
The position of the Utah court is also very clearly
spelled out in Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.
2d 410, decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1959, the
court said at page 411,
"Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy and
the court should be reluctant to deprive litigants
of an opportunity to fully present their contenDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tions upon trial. It should be granted only when
under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff he cannot recover as a matter of law/'
The evidence before the court viewed most favorable
to appellant shows an old existing fence line long acquiesced in and subsequently acknowledged by written
agreement to be the true boundary line between the
properties of Appellants and Respondent.
THE VITAL ISSUE in the case at bar is whether
a written agreement by adjacent property owners, ratifying, acquiescing in and re-establishing an old fenceline
boundary as the true boundary between the properties can
be nullified by a deed executed concurrent with said written agreeemnt, said deed unknowingly bearing a different
boundary description than intended and contained in the
agreement, contrary to the intentions, desires and actions
of the parties.
Respondent's position is that the deed executed concurrently with the written agreement nullifies the written agreement and controls the boundary regardless of
the intent of the parties to the agreement.
If Respondent's position prevails, agreements of contracting parties become unstable and cannot be relied
upon, thereby sustaining form over substance. In the
instant case, Appellents' and Respondent's predecessor
in interest entered into an agreement acquiescing in and
ratifying a boundary line. Respondent now seeks to
nullify that written agreement and acquiescence on a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
technicality. If Respondent's position is upheld, boundary line agreements between adjacent land owners will
become unreliable.
In International Paper Company v. J. T. Bridges,
the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit (1960),
279 F. 2d, p. 536 said:
"Appealing from the judgment, appellant is here
insisting that there were and are in the case
genuine issues of material facts and that, in disposing of the cause by summary judgments, the
district judge deprived the plaintiff of a trial
upon the issues tendered by it in its pleadings
and supported by its affidavits. These issues
were and are: (1) whether the lines which plaintiff claims as the true boundary between it and
defendant is the true line, as established by the
Harris Survey in 1821, under which both plaintiff and defendant claim; (2) whether, if it is not
the true line as originally established, it is the
boundary line between plaintiff and defendant,
established by agreement and acquiescence; and
(3) whether plaintiff's affidavits made and tendered an issue of prior possession which, though
controverted by the affidavits of the defendant,
could be resolved only by trial.
"We find ourselves in full agreement with these
contentions. The suit is in its essence a boundary suit, and in its determination on this record,
summary judgment had no place."
The United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
went on to say:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"In granting the motion for final summary judgment, the court incorrectly resolved as matter of
law factual controversies presented by the conflicting affidavits filed by plaintiff and defendant,
which could only be resolved on a trial."
Appellants are entitled to a trial to present evidence
of their claims that an old fenceline is the true line between the parties, and whether, if not the true line as
originally established, it is the boundary line established
by subsequent agreement and acquiescence. The evidence
put forward to the court can only be resolved by trial.
POINT II.
THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN TWO
ADJOINING LAND OWNERS MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT.
"Where the boundary line between two adjoining
land owners is uncertain, they may agree on a division
line between them, and when executed each will own up
to this line as if it were a natural boundary, or as if their
deeds or grants called for it, particularly if the agreement
is evidenced by a writing signed by the parties thereto."
11 C. J. S., Boundaries, Section 64, p. 636.
In Finley v. Funk, 35 Kan. 59, 16 P. 15, the Supreme
Court of Kansas on page 19 said:
"This agreement is somewhat ambiguous in its
terms, but the majority of the court are of the
opinion that it is valid, and that the petition
states a cause of action. The view taken by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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court is that all the provisions of the agreement
must be taken together; and if, by any reasonable
construction, it can be upheld, it should be done.
By this agreement the parties sought to settle
a perplexing question of boundaries, and avoid
what may might be a protracted and expensive
litigation. The agreement is one they had a
right to make, and its purpose is looked upon by
the courts with favor. It has been said, in a
case where disputed boundary lines were involved, that 'it is the policy of the law to allow
parties to settle and adjust doubtful and disputed
facts between themselves; and, when such a
matter, which before was uncertain, has been
established by agreement between the parties
upon good consideration passing between them,
they are not permitted afterwards to deny it.'
Bosberg. v. Teator, 32 N. Y. 567."
The Kansas Court further said:
"The fact that the parties entered into an agreement is evidence that they desired as far as possible to waive and dispense with formalities; and,
even if the agreement were formally defective,
the court should seek to uphold it, and carry
out the obvious intent of the parties."
In the above case there was a lapse of two years between the time of the agreement (June 11, 1884) and
the date of the court decision (October 7, 1886). A written agreement here did not require any appreciable time
lapse to become enforceable.
In 12 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 613 and 614, it is stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"It is well settled that where the boundary lines
of adjoining land owners are not definitely known
or their location is in dispute, such owners may
establish the lines either by a written agreement,
conveyance, or parole agreement. Such boundary lines may also be established by the parties'
mutual recognition of, and acquiescence in, certain lines as the true boundary lines, the courts
being reluctant to interfere therewith after the
lines have been permitted to exist over such a
period of time that satisfactory proof of the true
lines is difficult."
In the case at bar when the evidence is viewed most
favorable to Plaintiffs-Appellants, we have a fence established by long acquiescence, later reaffirmed by written
agreement, and further acquiesced in, all which entitled
Plaintiffs-Appellants to a trial. Defendant-Respondent
should be estopped to deny that the fence line established
and acquiesced in by her predecessors in interest, is the
true boundary between Appellants and Respondent.
Respondent would negate the written agreement between Appellants' and Respondent's predecessor in interest for lack of consideration. However, "Doubt and uncertainty constitute consideration for an oral agreement
establishing a boundary line." 69 A. L. R. p. 1456.
POINT III.

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A warranty deed was executed by the Appellants
to Simmons and Wiberg, predecessors in interest to the
Respondent (R. p. 67, Lines 5 through 7). A written
agreement had been entered into between the said Simmons and Wiberg, and Appellants dated March 13, 1962
(R. p. 67, Lines 1 through 3). This makes a period of
11 years of acquiescence since the date of said deed and
agreement and the purchase by Respondent.
In Ekberg, et ux. v. Bate, et ux., (1951), 121 Utah
123, 239 P. 2d 205, at page 208, the Utah Supreme Court
said:
"In the instant case as we have pointed out
above, there was a period of actual acquiescence
for more than seven years (the Utah limitations
period for adverse possession) before appellants
acquired their title and under all circumstances
shown herein there was a sufficient length of
time to establish the line so that appellants are
precluded from claiming that it is not the true
line."
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated its position
concerning boundary by acquiescence in Brown v. Milliner,
(1951), 120 Utah 16, 232 P. 2d 202, p. 207, as Mows:
"We have further held in this state that in the
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining property or their predecessors in interest
ever expressly agreed as to the location of the
boundary between them, if they have occupied
their respective premises up to an open boundary
line visably marked by monuments, fences or
buildings for a long period of time and mutually
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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recognized it as the dividing line between them,
the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do so consistently with
the facts appearing, and will not permit the
parties nor their grantees to depart from such
line. Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009,
. . . In Holmes v. Judge, supra, we declared that
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 'rest
upon sound public policy, with a view of preventing strife and litigation concerning boundaries' and that 'While the interest of society require that the title to real estate shall not be
transferred from the owner for slight cause, or
otherwise than by law, the same interests demand that there shall be stability in boundaries'. . ."
The Utah Supreme Court has long upheld boundaries established by acquiescence. In the instant case the
record indicates that there was an old fence of at
least 23 years and in addition that there had been subsequent written agreement predating the claim by the Respondent by 11 years. In the Ekberg case, cited above, 8
years was found to be sufficient time for the establishment of a boundary by acquiescence under the circumstances of that case. The lower court in the case at bar
in ruling from the bench acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
In boundary by acquiescence cases, each case is distinct and must be resolved on its own facts. PlaintiffsAppellants should be granted a trial to present their
claims. The Utah Supreme Court in Ekberg v. Bates
cited above said:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"The length of time necessary to establish a
boundary line by acquiescence has never been
definitely established in this jurisdiction. Each
case must usually be determined on its own facts.
In other jurisdictions there have been statements
made which indicate that the length of time
should be at least that prescribed by the Statute
of Limitations. See headnote to Annotation,
69 A. L. R. p. 1491; Birdsley v. Crane, 52 Minn.
537, 54 N. W. 740; Johnson v. Trump, 161 Iowa
512, 143 N. W. 510; and Kesler v. Ellis, 47 Idaho
740, 278 P. 366, 367, in which case the court
there said: "* * * 'While the authorities
are hopelessly confused and generously uncertain as to the time the acquiescence as to the
location of the boundary line should continue in
order to satisfy the rule, it is but logical to say
that such acquiescence must continue for a period of not less than five years, thus conforming
to the period established by the statute of limitation in cases of adverse possession, * * *'"
POINT IV.
COURTS HAVE LONG ACCEPTED THE
PRINCIPAL THAT PARTIES SHOULD BE
A L L O W E D TO MAKE THEIR AGREEMENTS AND THEREBY BE BOUND BY
THEM TO LIMIT THE CONSTANT AND
EVER-PRESENT POSSIBILITY O F F U TURE LITIGATION.
In 69 A. L. R. p. 1485 the problem is well analyzed
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"And it has been held that the rule applies, although the period of acquiescence in such agreed
boundary has not been long enough to confer
rights by limitation. Coleman v. Smith (1881),
55 Tex. 254. In that case it was said: 'The validity of an agreement for the settlement of the
boundary does not depend at all upon accuracy
with which the line is run. Whether the parties
were right or wrong in their belief that the line
they established and agreed upon as the boundary of their lands was precisely where it ought
to be, or where the original surveyor made it,
was wholely immaterial. It was enough if there
were doubt or dispute between them about it,
and they determined to settle it upon that basis.
If absolute exactness in defining the line were
necessary to render such an agreement binding,
it is not easy to perceive how it could be attained. Different surveyors with different instruments might locate the true line at different
places. An agreement made today upon the
survey of one might be set aside tomorrow upon
that of another, perhaps no less skillful or accurate. This would be to make agreements nugatory; whereas they are to be encouraged, favored,
and upheld, especially in these cases of doubtful
boundaries. Such cases are proverbally vexatious, and breed ill blood; and they are very apt
to arise in this country. It is notorious that
surveys have been hitherto very loosely made,
and often by incompetent surveyors. Lines have
been insufficiently marked in corners designated
by perishable objects. In the settling of the
country and the destroying axe of the settler
and time, have obliterated the path of the surveyor and destroyed the monuments he made.
And so, when the lines he ran cannot now be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
run, and the boundaries he fixed have become
of doubtful identity, and the parties to be
effected by them have mutually agreed that here
he fixed his lines and set their bounds, such
agreement should be held conclusive; not subject to be set aside or reopened upon any subsequent discovery that possibly a mistake was
made in that agreement as to the true locality'."
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Provonsha v.
Pitman, (1957), 6 Utah 2d 26, 305 P. 2d 486, p. 487 that:
". . . If by that time a boundary by acquiescence
has been established, and we think it had, under
principles heretofore announced by this court,
succeeding Grantees could not marshall their
disagreements or misunderstandings to destroy
that established boundary."
The agreement of parties concerning a boundary
line, long acquiesced in, or placed in writing have been
and should be upheld by the courts to give stability to
their agreements and to property lines acquiesced in for
a period of few or many years.
POINT V.
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT HAD NOTICE
OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' CLAIM ON
THE LAND IN QUESTION PRIOR TO PURCHASE AND SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO
DENY PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS.
That there was ample evidence of a claim by PlainDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tiffs-Appellants of the land in question is evident from
the record (R. 78, Lines 18 through 21; R. 82, Lines 2
through 5; R. 84, Lines 1 and 2, Lines 11 through 13,
Lines 17 through 25; R. 85, Lines 1 through 5).
In 66 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 441:
«* * * g U £ m e r e failure to record an instrument does not work an estoppel where the person asserting the estoppel was charged with notice of the true state of the title. * * *"
In 66 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 445 it is stated:
"* * * The words 'bona fide purchaser/
therefore, when introduced into the recording
acts, were intended to be in accordance with the
established meaning. To entitle one to the protection provided for bona fide purchasers by the
recording acts, it has been held to be essential:
(1) that he be the purchaser of the legal as distinguished from an equitable title; (2) that his
purchase was in good faith; (3) that he parted
with a valuable consideration therefor by paying
money or other thing of value, assuming a liability, or incurring an injury; and (4) that he
had no notice, and knew no facts sufficient to
put him on inquiry as to the other's equity,
either at the time of purchase, or at or before
the time he paid the purchased money, or otherwise parted with such value"
The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake, Garfield and
Western Railway Co., a corporation v. Allied Materials
Co., a corporation, Ketchum Builders Supply Co., a corDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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poration, (1955), 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P. 2d 883, p. 886,
quoted from 39 Am. Jur., Sec. 18, p. 242 as follows:
"'Possession of land is notice to the world of
every right that the possessor has therein, legal
or equitable; it is a fact putting all persons on
inquiry as to the nature of the occupant's claims
as well as the claims of the persons under whom
he occupies. Possession is notice, however, of
only such facts as inquiry of the occupant would
naturally disclose, * * *. Where a purchaser
is in possession under an unrecorded deed, his
possession is notice of his title, * * V "
The Utah Court goes on to say:
"Defendants made no inquiry of plaintiff although the plaintiff's railroad ran adjacent to
defendants' land and notwithstanding plaintiff's
poles, guy wires and trolley wires were within
the description of defendants' land.
"We are of the opinion that defendants had constructive notice of the claims and rights of plaintiff in and to the land in question by reason of
the poles, guy wires and trolley wires on the
premises claimed by the defendants and by reason of the reservation recited deeds from defendants as predecessor in title."
Respondent having had constructive notice which
would readily have revealed to them upon reasonable inquiry any and all claims of appellants should be estopped
from denying that the old fenceline in existence at the
time of their purchase is in fact the true boundary between the parties.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellants urge that the decision of the lower
court be reversed and the matter remanded for trial. It
is abundantly clear from the evidence which has been
made part of this record, including the transcripts of the
hearings, that there has been an old fence line long acquiesced in as the boundary line between the property
owners and their predecessors in interest; which acquiescence and subsequent written agreement ratify and
further acquiescing in said boundary line should not be
be lightly ignored, cancelled or vacated by the court.
There are sufficient facts and law before the court to entitle Appellant to a trial on the issues. Granting summary
judgment in the instant case was capricious and arbitrary
and not justified by the evidence before the court. The
lower court decision should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
FROERER, HOROWITZ,
PARKER, THORNLEY,
CRITCHLOW & JENSEN
Robert E. Froerer, Esquire
2610 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Appellants
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